Should I get a flu shot?  How well did this go last year? by Just, Winfried et al.
The problem of how to induce people to make vaccination decisions that would be optimal
from the point of view of the population has been widely studied over the last decade.
When vaccination carries real or perceived costs, individual rational choices in the so-called
vaccination game are know to lead to Nash equilibria that are suboptimal at the population
level. In reality, the underlying assumption of perfect rationality is unrealistic; actual
decision-making is more likely based on a mixture of rational calculations of (mis)perceived
costs, imitation, and individual prior experience.
In this talk we will discuss existing models of these decision-making procedures for flu
vaccination and present a simple model for studying vaccination strategies that are based
exclusively on the host’s most recent experience, but are not necessarily rational or deter-
ministic. The model is intended as a tool for elucidating the role of behavior based on
individual experience first in isolation and then in combination with decision procedures
that incorporate additional information.
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